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Abstract
The present article is about Niqabi women belonging to the private Telegram instant messaging channel Orgullo Niqabi
(Spanish for ‘Niqabi Pride’). More specifically, our main objective is to explain what they are demanding, how they ar-
ticulate their demands through that channel, and why they use it for communicating and to organize their actions. Said
demands are mainly linked to their recognition as autonomous and political individuals within the different contexts in
which they find themselves. First, our analysis will focus on categorizing their social and political demands for being rec-
ognized, not only as Muslims, but also as autonomous, independent, and political beings. Second, we intend to explain
how those demands, expressed in the virtual world, are articulated in specific actions in the different societies and social
contexts in which these women live. To this end, this article analyzes, following the procedures of the Grounded Theory,
the discourses obtained through 27 in-depth interviews conducted in the first half of the year 2019. The strength of this
research lies in overcoming the difficult access to these women and their discourses as well as in clarifying who they are,
what they are demanding from the societies in which they live, how and why they are virtually grouped and the conse-
quences of their virtual grouping in the different societies in which each of them lives.
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1. Introduction
Over the last years, we have witnessed the convergence
of countless changes shaping the idiosyncrasies of peo-
ple along with the essence of their bonds, due to the
revolution of ICTs as well as to the liquid nature of our
societies (Bauman, 2007; Castells, 2008; Žižek, 2003). In
our societies we have gone from the prevalence of a
completely analogical reality to that of a hybrid real-
ity, where online and offline activities coexist in some
kind of symbiosis that makes possible the emergence
of new channels of communication that were inconceiv-
able until now (Olmeda, 2014). Moreover, this has al-
lowed people, collectives, and communities like that of
Niqabi women to find new places for association, vindi-
cation, and even fighting. This way, the discourses of a
lot of these individuals that, until now, were being si-
lenced and strategically distorted—as a result, among
other matters, of what Thompson calls “mediated visi-
bility” (Thompson, 2005)—have found their (previously
unthinkable) place. Nancy Fraser talks about “subaltern
counterpublics” to refer to parallel discursive spaces
where members of subordinated social groups make up
and circulate counter-discourses, which in turn allows
them to formulate alternative interpretations of their
identities, interests and needs (Fraser, 1997, p. 115). This
could be the case of Niqabi women in Telegram, the lat-
ter acting as a refuge and a place for regrouping on the
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one hand, and as a base for spreading, planning, and or-
ganizing activities aimed at reaching broader audiences
on the other (Fraser, 1997). Telegram is an instant mes-
saging application similar to WhatsApp but with the par-
ticularity of featuring secret chats and using encrypted
data. Messages are client-client encrypted, and they can-
not be sent or downloaded again. In any case, as in other
contexts linked to citizen participation, by using Telegram
these women have taken advantage of the change ICTs
have brought to the method of social participation,
which until now was influenced by the institutions. In
this new environment, the philosophy of ‘do it yourself’
prevails. Here, the individual can become a prosumer
of information contents in an autonomous way without
depending on mass media, mass-communication net-
works or political agendas (McLuhan & Barrington, 1972;
Toffler, 1980). In this respect, Howard Rheingold (2004)
talks about “smart mobs” referring to those persons ca-
pable of acting together without knowing each other,
similar to the concept of imagined communities catego-
rized by Anderson (2006). Members of these groups co-
operate in ways that would be inconceivable in the past
without the novel information and communication sys-
tems we have today and which allow us, among many
other things, to connect with other systems and even to
other people’s phones (Rheingold, 2004), which have be-
come a highly efficient way of spreading and exchanging
information, thanks to their portability.
Thus, our objective is the analysis of the discourses
of Niqabi women, specifically in relation to the demands
and vindications they express in Telegram and how they
use this space to articulate them. To achieve this ana-
lytical purpose, we have used Grounded Theory, start-
ing with general questions, not hypotheses. Some of
the questions were: Who are these women? What do
they demand from the societies in which they live? Why
did they choose to communicate using Telegram? Do
their grouping and demands have some impact on of-
fline life? The characteristics or attributes (variables) of
our study have therefore emerged from the analysis car-
ried out. Thus, we want to stress that our discoveries
and the development of the theory are not based on
deductive reasoning supported by a previous theoretical
framework (Charmaz, 1990), but following the aforemen-
tioned methodology.
In order for readers to fully comprehend the question
we are addressing we will start talking about Telegram,
the space where everything takes place. We will explain
in detail every aspect of the proceeding, the methodol-
ogy and the variables deduced from the analysis. This
way, readers will have the whole picture of our questions
and how we tried to answer them.
2. Telegram as a Subaltern Corner
Telegram may be used for a great variety of purposes
(leisure, publicity, etc.). However, in the case of Orgullo
Niqabi, it is used as a subaltern spacewhosemain feature
is to give room to the ‘non-normative,’ that is to say, to
all kinds of users, without discrimination, groups which
are not a majority or that are non-normative, subversive,
and even of criminal or terrorist nature. These spaces are
useful, among other things, for ‘alternative’ communica-
tion, that is, for giving voice to those individuals, groups,
collectives, and even social movements of all kind that
are silenced in life ‘offline.’ This allows them to put aside
the ‘marginalization’ of the limited spaces where their
voices could be heard. More specifically, Telegram chan-
nels are groups where people can send all kinds of con-
tents: messages, pictures, links, files, etc. Channels may
be public or private, and people can only access private
channels if the creator of the group adds them or sends
them an invitation to join. Channels are usually built
around subjects and common interests shared by all of
their users. A particularity of these channels is that mes-
sages are encrypted and can be ‘destroyed’ after a sched-
uled time without leaving a trace. It is precisely this pe-
culiarity of Telegram which made Niqabi women choose
this virtual space for creating their subaltern corner. On
the one hand, it gives them the opportunity to freely
express their interests and opinions and, on the other,
whatever they say is kept private and far from the vigi-
lance of their countries’ state control mechanisms. That
way, this space possess the double functionality of subal-
tern spaces: It functions both as a safe place for retreat-
ing and regrouping (that is why we call it a ‘corner’) and
as the ‘headquarters’ for planning and organizing their
actions. Moreover, it is in these subaltern spaces where
alternative, divergent and subversive ideas are often pre-
sented, even ideas contrary to the hegemonic ones, in
relation to the diversity of subjects, including identity
(Downey & Fenton, 2003). Thus, the goal of this arti-
cle is to analyze and explain how, through one of these
spaces—the subaltern corner we consider the commu-
nity Orgullo Niqabi is in Telegram—women are grouped
and organized, and how they articulate their political and
social demands in order to go beyond the virtual world
to the various realities to which they belong.
3. Methodology
3.1. Participants
The protagonists of our article are, as we have previ-
ouslymentioned, Niqabi women.We call ‘Niqabiwomen’
thosewho, on the one hand, define themselves as Niqabi
and, on the other hand, cover their face, hands, body,
and feet, leaving uncovered only their eyes. However,
these women associate the niqab not only to clothing,
but to a form of behaving and living in the world that has
to accompany said clothing and which is linked to a fun-
damentalist interpretation of Islam (Ainz, 2018). We un-
derstand fundamentalism as a religious way of thinking
and acting which maintains that politics should be based
on religious brotherhood. Its objective is to have soci-
eties once again centered around a religious order based
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on a holy book. In this regard, the holy book is considered
full of sense and meaning, and it cannot be decomposed
or freely interpreted by human reason. This way, divine
law is declared superior to any form of society created
by human beings. In the case of Islamic fundamentalism
Roy (1992) identifies two trends within Islam: one rep-
resenting part of the current Muslim movements, with
a reformist style and not against modernity; the other
(traditionalist) aiming to go back to the roots of Islam
(the Quran and the Sunnah) and strictly and rigorously
applying them to every sphere of society. According to
Roy (1992), the former root defends an updated social
and political model based on the precepts of the Islamic
religion and criticizing traditionalism. The latter, which
represents the women that participated in our study,
rejects innovation and accepts the message from the
past literally, which these women understand as ideal
and still in force, accepting the validity of the founding
texts and the prevalence of the Islamic law (the Sharia)
over earthly, objective law. The origin of this second cur-
rent lays, on the one hand, in what Roy (2010) calls “re-
ligious deculturation” and, on the other hand, in secu-
larism. Religious deculturation takes place, essentially,
by taking religion out of the public space. Secularism
produces religion, says Roy (2010), who criticizes the
presented solution, i.e., relegate religion to the private
sphere. According to the author, the outcome of this so-
lution is that a lot of believers respond with a will to re-
conquer the world they have lost.
With the aim of gathering and analyzing their iden-
tity, political and social demands, as well as understand-
ing how Telegram is used as a space to gather said de-
mands, we conducted 27 in-depth interviews with some
of the members of the group Orgullo Niqabi.
Significant facts about these women, apart from
those on Table 1 is that all of them say they are free
and have willingly chosen the niqab, they all commu-
nicate in Spanish (some of them perfectly, others with
some degree of difficulty), and they belong to various
Islamic, Spanish-speaking online groups. In fact, it was in
those groups that the idea of creating the Telegram chan-
nel first arose, a channel composed of Niqabi women
from several Facebook and Telegram groups, and from
Spanish-speaking forums. Attending to why they partici-
pate in this group, there are several parameters: (1) to in-
tensify their practice of Islam; (2) to reassert their choice
for the niqab; (3) to search the support and strength nec-
essary to keep or start using the niqab; (4) to practice
proselytism and encourage ‘other sisters,’ as they call it,
to find that strength they search for choosing the niqab;
Table 1. Profiles of the interviewees (all names have been changed at the request of the women participating in the
research).
Name Age Residence Nationality Occupation
Samia 23 Germany Turkey Housewife
Dunia 19 Spain Morocco Unemployed
Zyneb 25 Spain Morocco Housewife
Fatin 35 Mexico Tunisia Housewife
Sara 34 Mexico Mexico Housewife
Sonia 39 Mexico Mexico Housewife
Souad 27 Mexico Mexico Housewife
Ikram 41 United States Colombia Housewife
Meryem 31 United States Colombia Housewife
Dunia 31 United States Spain Housewife
Hakima 32 Romania Romania Housewife
Salima 28 France Algeria Housewife
Ahlam 25 France Algeria Housewife
Fatima 27 Chile Uruguay Housewife
Islam 28 Chile Chile Unemployed
Romina 27 Venezuela Venezuela Housewife
María 35 Venezuela Morocco Housewife
Hanna 35 Venezuela Turkey Housewife
Farida 33 Venezuela Turkey Housewife
Yasmin 25 Venezuela Syria Unemployed
Mery 34 United Kingdom Iraq Housewife
Ratsida 26 United Kingdom Algeria Housewife
Hafida 33 United Kingdom Algeria Housewife
Melika 29 United Kingdom Morocco Housewife
Nour 36 United Kingdom Morocco Housewife
Amina 25 United Kingdom Spain Housewife
Falak 19 United Kingdom Spain Unemployed
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(5) to fight for their rights as Niqabi women. Regarding
their main reason for being Niqabi, some of them have
only spiritual or religious reasons, while others have also
stated political reasons.
Concerning their educational level, five (5) women
possess a basic level of education, 19 of them hold an
intermediate level, and three (3) of them have a degree.
Attending to their socialization in Islam, we find worth
mentioning that there are 12 women who declare to
“have turned to Islam,” that is, they are converted. The
rest were born and raised in Muslim families with dif-
ferent ways and intensities of living and practicing Islam.
When asked if they were married—something of special
interest when considering the converted ones—there
are 14 women that are married, six (6) of them are con-
verted. The rest is single. Attending to their jobs, some of
themdeclare to be housewives and the rest unemployed.
This is significant, since most of the housewives consider
that women’s work should be essentially tied to care in
general and domestic care in particular. Thus, working
outside home is for men. However, those who are un-
employed do manifest that they would like to work, al-
though their jobs should be halal (allowed) for women,
mostly linked to care and to those spheres that they—
and traditional patriarchal cultures—consider ‘women’s
jobs.’ We would like to stress that this study is some-
what peculiar, since these women’s features are not
representative of all Niqabi women around the world,
which in some cases are forced to cover their bodies, and
whose interpretation of the niqab, linked to subordina-
tion, is different.
3.2. Procedure
After years of continued online participation on several
Spanish-speaking forums, groups, channels and social
networks and their subsequent analysis (Ainz, Checa, &
González, 2011), as well as having participated in several
Islamic communities and associations (Ainz, 2017) pay-
ing special attention to the discrimination that Muslim
women suffered (Ainz, 2011), one of the authors of
the present article was given the opportunity of joining
the Telegram channel Orgullo Niqabi. Said channel, as
we have pointed out, is composed of Niqabi women or
women about to become Niqabi.
In order to conduct the 27 interviews, we used the
program Skype, mainly for two reasons. The first is that
many of the women interviewed resided outside Spain.
The second and most important one has to do with the
availability of the participants, who declared that, for var-
ious reasons, they preferred the interviews to be con-
ducted that way. Regarding their reasons, it should be
noted that many of them were closely linked to lack of
time, the impossibility of reaching an agreement on the
time and place of meeting, and the preference of using
Skype since they could do the interviews at what they
called their “free time.” In fact, 19 out of the 27 women
stated that if they did not do the interview via Skype
it would be very difficult for them to participate in the
study. With this reality on the table, we decided to fully
adapt ourselves to what they considered appropriate in
terms of how to conduct the interviews and the sched-
ules they set. Taking into account that many of the par-
ticipants reside in countries other than Spain, such as
Mexico, the United States, Venezuela, Romania, France,
Germany, Chile, and the United Kingdom, some of the in-
terviews were conducted at untimely hours. We would
like to point out that the interviews were conducted
over six months, but in the lead up to these interviews
preparatory work was carried out over approximately
one and a half years with participants. This involved es-
tablishing contacts, building trust, and participating in
many Islamic groups. Finally, our opportunity to partici-
pate in the Telegram group Orgullo Niqabi came, as we
said, after our participation in different Islamic forums
and a continuous interaction with the women subject of
the study. It should be noted that it was not easy to earn
their trust and conduct the interviews. One of the most
active and interacting women, who is also the founder of
the community, was the onewho acted as a ‘key,’ making
interviews possible. After much thought and after “do-
ing salat istikhara” (a prayer consulting Allah) she consid-
ered a good idea to participate, arguing that it could be
a good way of becoming visible. Thus, she encouraged
women to participate by publishing an announcement
on theOrgulloNiqabi channel. From thatmoment on,we
could see a participatory spirit and attitude among the
women. Specifically, 27 of the 143 women in the chan-
nel finally participated. Previously, there had been more
of them that had expressed their interest, but finally, for
various reasons, they did not participate in the study. The
interviews were conducted in Spanish, and the quotes
used in this text are translations made by the authors.
3.3. Data Analysis Method
In order to analyze the interviews we have used the
procedures offered by the Grounded Theory (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967), which are related to the systematization
of information and the development of analytical cate-
gorizations that show the most relevant patterns within
the data. The Grounded Theory has its origin in the
Chicago school of sociology and the development of sym-
bolic interactionism at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury (Ritzer, 1993). Symbolic interactionism says that it
is people who take part in society, individuals are con-
sidered social actors continuously shaping their environ-
ment (Cuff, Sharrock, & Francis, 1990).
We used the program Atlas.Ti6 as encoding manager
and for the creation of different codes on which the con-
stant comparative method—which consists in analyzing
the incidents contained within the data in order to find
similarities and differences (Carrero, Soriano, & Trinidad,
2012)—was applied. By doing so, we established four
central categories. The first one, subaltern corner, refers
to identity, political and/or social demands, as well as
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to the space and how these women use it to articu-
late said demands. The second category, the anger, is
called that way based on the expression “it angers me
that…,” which a lot of these women used for express-
ing their discontent and argue their membership in the
group Orgullo Niqabi. This is what in Grounded Theory is
known as in vivo coding, that is to say, it is codified tak-
ing into account the expressions and literal language of
the participants, given its relevance to the study. We un-
derstand that this ‘common anger’ that gives rise to the
codification has a fundamental symbolic powerwhichwe
will describe throughout the analysis. The third category,
nodes, refers to what these women have described as a
non-isolated individualization, that is, they say that they
perceive their cultural, family and personal particulari-
ties individually within the group but, besides, they feel
united by the niqab and everything around it, especially
everything related to their discrimination, which all of
them perceive in the same way. Finally, the fourth cat-
egory, silent construction, refers to the social and polit-
ical actions they plan and intend to transcend the vir-
tual plane, carrying them out in their daily contexts, rein-
forced by their virtual grouping on Telegram and based
on a strong group conscience.
4. Results
4.1. Orgullo Niqabi: An Online, Subaltern Space
Many silenced—or even marginalized—voices have
found on the Internet, social networks, and instant mes-
saging applications in general a space where they can
be heard. In this particular case they have found it in
one of the subaltern corners that Telegram offers. The
Niqabi women under study claim to have found there
what they call their community, Orgullo Niqabi, a space
where they can express themselves freely, where they
can share ideas in a horizontal communicative way, by-
passing censorship and manipulation mechanisms, as
stated by some of the interviewees when asked in which
way did Orgullo Niqabi contribute to their lives:
I decided to become Niqabi, if one can really decide
that. In fact, it is a command from Allah. The thing is
that I found myself very alone. Even my Hijabi friends,
you know, the ones that wear a veil, toldme that I was
very radical, they questioned me. There was a mo-
ment when I even doubted about my mental health.
Finding this community of sisters in Telegram has
mademe very happy, it has brought me a lot of peace.
I am very grateful to Allah for putting these sisters in
my way. Here we are free, we say what we please, we
express ourselves freely, we encourage each other in
the way of Allah, in improving our practice. Thus, “our
imam,” our faith is much greater. We don’t have to
worry about giving explanations or continuously de-
bunking myths about the niqab. (Samia, Germany)
Nobody understood me until I came here, I had
no friends, everybody judged me in my environ-
ment, in my family….Society doesn’t understand
me, fine, but neither does my family and they are
old-fashioned Muslims. The sisters in this community
savedmy life [laughs]. In Spain, people talk about free-
dom and democracy, but I find myself very limited.
(Dunia, Spain)
When asked why they used Telegram and not other in-
stantmessaging applications,womenparticipating in our
study were very clear: they consistently referred to pri-
vacy, control, and vigilance. That is one of the main rea-
sons why we talk about subaltern corner. Telegram is
where thesewomen feel somewhat safe to express them-
selves avoiding state control mechanisms. The fact that
channels are private and require an invitation to join, and
that messages can self-destroy, are the main factors why
these women have found in Telegram their ideal place
for meeting and expressing themselves:
Look, I am going to be clear. Here in Spain, I used to
use Facebook. Muslims in general talked too much.
There was a time when you could be arrested for
nothing. There was this feeling that anything could
be linked to terrorism. I’m not talking about Niqabi
women, but almost anything you would do….I don’t
know how to explain it, anything…religious? Anything
could be misunderstood and you could end up in jail.
(Dunia, Spain)
Sometimes you were comfortably discussing on a
Muslim group in Facebook, knowing some brothers
and sisters, and the group was suddenly dismantled.
Overnight, just like that. Then you knew from rumors
that someone had been investigated, they had been
reading our messages, who knows? You didn’t even
know who you were talking to, do you understand?
You didn’t know if people next to you were sisters,
brothers, the police…that was a problem. It does not
happen in Telegram. We know who we are inviting to
the group, who is in, who is not….Telegram allows you
to bemore selective and feel safer. It allows you to say
whatever you want, always within the parameters al-
lowedby theQuran and the Sunnah, of course! It’s not
necessary even to give your phone number, when you
are fed up or something you can simply say goodbye.
(Amina, United Kingdom)
Finding a safe space was followed by organization:
Derived from the opportunity to express themselves
freely, these women were starting to draw up a mani-
festo calledManifiesto Niqabi when the interviews were
conducted. There, they were gathering their impressions
about the discrimination they perceive in their lives and
expressing their identity, social and political demands. In
this regard, two of the women declared:
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The main fact we are expressing there is that we are
not submissive, that being Niqabi is something volun-
tary. We do it not as an order from our husbands,
I’m not married. Neither it is from our parents. Our
parents have nothing to do either. My father passed
away, and I think he would be totally against it, he
was a very modern man. I was very modern as well,
I have danced, I have been topless, I have had sex,
I have gone to the disco, may Allah forgive me. Luckily,
I saw the right path. What we currently want is to let
people know that we are free, nobody is forcing us
in our countries, either. A lot of us are against how
some women are forced, we understand that is not
Islam. Islam is not force, it is passion. The niqab has
to be well explained for women to be able to open
their eyes. (Zyneb, Spain)
I laugh when somebody thinks that we are poor girls,
that we are dumb and forced. People talk about us
without knowing anything. That’s the goal of theman-
ifest: It’s for people to know that there is a brain under
the cloth and that because there is a brain, there is a
cloth. (Fatin, Mexico)
4.2. The Anger
Tang and Yang (2011) pointed out in one of their texts that
it is somewhat of a fallacy to believe that the Internet,
throughout its several social networks, browsers and
phone applications distributes symbolic power among or-
dinary people. They point out that it would be better to
say that “the internet offers ordinary people the poten-
tial of this power” (Tang & Yang, 2011, p. 677). In turn,
Thompson defines symbolic power as the “capacity to in-
tervene in the course of events, to influence the actions of
others and indeed to create events, by means of the pro-
duction and transmission of symbolic forms” (Thompson,
2005, p. 19). Moreover, he says that it could materialize
in interpreting others’ symbols, creating opinion about
others, etc. This power comes from the production, trans-
mission and interpretation of “significant symbolic forms”
(Thompson, 2005, p. 19). The author also points to reli-
gious, educational or media institutions as paradigmatic
institutions of this type of power (Thompson, 2005, p. 34).
The women under study express through their discourses
their disagreement with some misconceptions that our
societies have about them. Some examples are associat-
ing Islam to Arab territories and generalizing about Islam
even though there are a lot of different schools, branches,
and interpretations of this religion. These ideas are clearly
reflected in the following paragraphs:
The fact that people think that we are what we are
not makes me feel frustrated and angry. They define
you, they tag you and then to top it, they discriminate
you because of what they suppose you are. I wanted
to go to the beach this summer, with what the media
call burkini, and there I went. Not alone, because I am
afraid of being jeered. I wentwith some friends. That’s
another story: to get yourMuslim (Muslim!) friends to
go to the beach with you. “Get out of here!” people
said. I mean, first they tag you as submissive (you are
“forced”), but then they are the ones that don’t let you
swim. They discriminate you. Somebody explain [this]
to me, please. (Sara, Mexico)
The other day, I went to a shop to see some clothes.
It was completely a show, a real show, because peo-
ple look at me wherever I go. I was leaving the shop
and I heard: “Go back to your country!” “But miss,”
I replied, “I am fromhere, fromGuadalajara itself. I am
more Mexican than a taco!” They don’t realize that
one doesn’t need to be an Arab in order to beMuslim.
One thing is the Din, the religion, as you call it, and
other is your origin. (Sonia, Mexico)
I know that mass media are very harmful. They show
Iranian women, which are not even Sunni, or women
from Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan wearing a burqa
and they say: “They are being forced, they are being
forced.” Well, you know? Some of them are forced,
and I don’t like that, but some are probably not forced,
as is our case, and they can follow the path of Islam
with all the love in the world. (Islam, Chile)
Castells (2009), in turn, introduces in this regard the emo-
tion of ‘anger’ as a possible response to these circum-
stances, and that is why we decided to name this section
so. It is well known that, with the Internet in general and
with social networks and instant messaging applications
in particular, everyone can share their ideas, perceptions,
interests and, indeed, their frustration and anger, with
a greatly broad audience. One of the issues that angers
these women the most is, as we have seen, the inade-
quacy, the lack of correlation between what they claim
to be and their perception of what the society interprets
they are. Castells says in this regard that “if rage is indeed
a purely individual feeling, the SMS will harmlessly drift
in the ocean of digital communication. But if many peo-
ple open the bottle thrown into the ocean, the genie will
come out and an insurgent community will grow through
the connection of different minds beyond the lonely re-
volt” (Castells, 2009, p. 473). All of this can be seen in the
following extracts:
Here we were almost all of us online some minutes
ago, talking, thinking about how to manage and what
to do with these feelings that upset us so much.
We are very active, you know? We have been very ac-
tive in social networks, especially in Facebook, help-
ing some sisters that wanted to start using the niqab,
which had doubts or suffered just for wearing it or for
wanting to do it but not being able to do so, due to
their fears. But that’s enough, we are many, we have
to organize, make ourselves visible for who we really
are and take action. (Sara, Mexico)
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May Allah forgiveme, I speak frankly, sometimes I feel
hate, because we are not allowed to spread out, but
you see, people here are starting to become aware.
We, the Mexican sisters, along with the mosque, do a
very important job of inviting to Islam. Butwemust do
more, not only as sisters, not only as Muslims, but as
Niqabi, because even Muslim sisters, yes, that’s right,
what you hear, they discriminate us for being Niqabi.
I was Christian, and God said “turn the other cheek,”
but Islam, subhana Allah [praised be Allah], says noth-
ing like that, and we are fed up with being seen as
fools. (Ikram, United States)
Sometimes I end up frustrated and fed up. It angers
me! People don’t understand or accept us, and they
don’t want to. Sometimes I think that it would have
been better to have been born in a Muslim country,
with yourwhole family beingMuslim,within a context
more akin to my way of feeling and living my life. But
I live here and I was born in this family, alhamdulilah
[thanks Allah]. The good thing is that I can be an exam-
ple to others, I can help other sisters with the same
problem and I can be by their side so they don’t feel
alone. (Souad, Mexico)
4.3. The Nodes
The Internet in general and Telegram in particular are use-
ful not only for certain groups to communicate, as is the
case of Niqabi women, but it is also a platform to carry
out actions that allow, in turn, what could be defined as
‘non-isolated individualization’: being alone ‘in person,’
but being connected to something bigger that transcends
the physical world; the network, the virtual world, the
community. Being a node within a network implies a pe-
culiar perception and participation that we can see re-
flected in the different arguments these women give:
Orgullo Niqabi has brought us together as sisters but,
moreover, it has given us our faith in the community,
our Umma, back. It’s incredible how we can feel so
close being so far. It’s a feeling I cannot explain. I can
spendweekswithout talking tomy parents, but I can’t
spend even half an afternoon without talking to my
sisters. In the beginning, whenwewere knowing each
other, I thought “how different we are!” I couldn’t be-
lieve it! But in the end that difference has enriched us
all, it has made us to learn from each other. Allah is
great. Who would have told me that I would find this
great support on the phone? I was very critical with
mobile phones! (Meryem, United States)
According to Castells (2009), two cultural patterns con-
verge in networks: individualism and communalism. On
the one hand, users browse the Internet in the soli-
tude of their persons with all their cultural and personal
particularities, in front of their computers’ or their mo-
bile phones’ screens; and on the other hand, they tend
to form ‘communities in practice,’ that is, groups of in-
dividuals who share interests, values and beliefs. This
can be clearly seen in the statements of some of the
Niqabi women:
Look, no. We are a lot of sisters, in this group. All of
us Niqabi, but all of us well different. We all have in
common our love to Allah; we all have in common the
Salat, the prayer, five times a day; we all have in com-
mon the Ramadan. But look little lady, some of us like
blond men, others like dark-haired ones; some of us
cook couscous, others cook tacos; some of us have
lived in an Arab or Muslim country, others haven’t
seen Syria even in television. Some of us have, you
know, some of us have a Muslim family and others
have turned to Islam right now, some years or even
months ago. What we have in common is Islam, the
niqab, and now the group of sisters Orgullo Niqabi
and our faith in carrying out a joint Project that is yet
to be outlined. (Dunia, United States)
I have my own life. I grew up listening to Bob Marley
becausemy brother likes his music a lot, he was some-
what a stoner [laughs], may Allah forgive me, may
Allah guide him. Some sisters have never listened reg-
gae, it scares them. Some sisters say that they have
voted right-wing parties in the past, but I consider my-
self a left-wing person. The more to the left, the bet-
ter. Here in Spain, left-wing politicians are the ones
helping us. They are the ones that will let us enter the
scene and be heard, I think. (Dunia, Spain)
4.4. Silent Construction
Wecould say that thesewomenhave constructed around
the community Orgullo Niqabi a series of discourses
and practices typical of what could be called ‘symbolic
community.’ This particular community, located in cy-
berspace, with no apparent physical reference, presents
liminal characteristicswhich, on the one hand, reflect the
common significance that the actions thesewomen carry
out have for them and, on the other hand, transform
them and create new ones. The “community Orgullo
Niqabi,” as these women call it, has not been limited or
focused only in allowing them to express what they expe-
rience or how they feel with respect to their experience
but, besides, the channel has been articulated as the ba-
sis for clearly planned future actions:
Meeting us on the private channel in Facebook was
the beginning and creating the WhatsApp group was
the second step. From there wemigrated to Telegram,
and herewehave gained strength and confidence.We
are many and we want to associate internationally, to
create something big, hence the elaboration of the
manifesto.Wewant to come to light and be heard and
be able to participate in the social life that we are de-
nied wherever we live. (Hakima, Romania)
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I don’t know if you know what dawa is, if not, I tell
you, it is an invitation to Islam. Well, that’s what we
want, to be active with this, spreading the message.
Just imagine, we are a lot of sisters here. If each
of us shows the path or makes the path easier to
other two sisters, just imagine that! By now, that is
our little big purpose, our project: To make women
turn to Islam; Christian ones, Jews, atheists, every-
one! We coordinate ourselves in the group for that,
too. (Salima, France)
When asked if their project is part of—or responds to—
some kind of institution, organization, mosque or some-
thing similar, these women answer “no,” they say they
are “independent.” Moreover, they point out that, al-
though it is true that they openly consider themselves
Salafists, it is also true that, according to their discourses,
behind the Niqabi group there is only faith for Allah and
the attempt to spread what they consider “true Islam.”
When asked about this matter, they tell us about a fun-
damentalist Islam where private life is intended not to
be separated from political life, where people are in-
tended to practice as many of the Prophet’s teachings
as possible, and where the Quran is interpreted and
followed literally. The latter characteristics are those
that authors such as Pace and Guolo (2006) attribute
to fundamentalism:
We don’t follow anyone, I mean, we don’t have
any organization or political party behind. It is true
that many of us like Muslim Brotherhood, but there
are some sisters that don’t even know what that is.
As I’ve told you, we are very different people. The
only thing we have in common is our imam, our faith
in Allah, in our Prophet, and that we all feel Niqabi.
(Ahlam, France)
Yes, I am Salafist, but Salafism is not terrorism. People
are completely wrong. Salafism is the pure essence of
Islam, the true practice of Islam carried out by our an-
cestors, the companions of the Prophet. It is practic-
ing Islam without worrying about anything or anyone
except Allah. I don’t like terrorism, Allah doesn’t order
that, but he does order us to be strict in our practice,
and that’s why I am Niqabi. Salafism is nothing but
the desire to, in a way, return to the origins of Islam.
I know it is very difficult, but if we can do anything, al-
ways peacefully and democratically, of course, wewill.
(Fatima, Chile)
It was recently that I discovered what being Salafi
means. In some Muslim chats, when you practice
Islam and try to do things the best you can, I see
that some people say, somewhat pejoratively, “that
is salafi” or salafist, like, “that person is a radical, it’s
no use.” Nothing is further from reality. I understand
Salafism as following the Din, the path of Allah, as
strictly as possible. (Melika, United Kingdom)
5. Conclusion
The women under study are not representative of all
Niqabi women, since there are several Arab countries
where women are constrained to ‘opt’ for the niqab. For
example, in Saudi Arabia they are constrained to wear
clothes similar to the niqab, something they call abaya.
This collective declares to have freely and voluntarily cho-
sen to be Niqabi—with all shades that may be given to
that when talking about liberties. In this regard it’s worth
mentioning that their discourses take place in a west-
ern, modern context. They live in countries that have un-
dergone intense secularization processes even though
their political positions and regimes are very different.
Moreover, we guess and propose as hypothesis for fu-
ture research that there are differences between Niqabi
women living in western countries and whose identity
is constructed using the Internet, and those who do not
have access to the Internet or whose use of the niqab is
not motivated by a religious norm.
With that said, as we have seen, Niqabi women
belonging to the virtual community Orgullo Niqabi in
Telegram interpret the world in a fundamentalist way.
Paradoxically, even though these women demand a re-
turn to the origins, to a considerably idealized past based
on religious parameters, they use some emerging, mod-
ern tools as an identity, social and even political claim.
That is, in a way, these women are modern, but not
modernist. We can say that, when the interviews were
conducted, these women were in the dawning of giving
birth to a possible social movement grounded on a pa-
cific reaction to modernity. Some theorists argue that
these types of reaction brought together under any kind
of social movement derive from economy globalization,
while others consider that they derive from the crisis
of the traditional family model. Some others maintain
that contemporary societies are always in the frontier
between social change and individual mobility, and that
is the reason why we are bound to periodically doubt
of the benefits of modernity and secularization and to
yearn for the safety of traditional institutions and values.
It is clear, however, that this group of women has found
in Telegram the locus of enunciation they needed to ex-
press themselves and where they can deliberate freely,
without having to be represented by an intermediary un-
connected to their collective (Spivak, 1999).
Far from victimhood, this community presents itself
as an agent for social change. These women reformu-
late a situation that they perceive discriminatory and
grounded on prejudices and stereotypes, and they find
their own mechanisms and a space where they can fight
and articulate their demands, especially those concern-
ing their identity. They carry out this through the elabo-
ration of a manifesto which we do not know whether it
is already finished or not but, in any case, it has not been
published yet. At the same time, they plan their expan-
sionist project away from any watchful eye which might
condition their demands. All of this is carried out in the
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non-space, the corner that Telegram is for them, legally
coexisting in our societies but on the fringes of legality
and its legitimate mechanisms of vigilance (conventional
or not). That would be another subject worth discussing
but, without getting into moral or ethic debate, said vig-
ilance might come from the perception that the differ-
ent security corps have: They see the potential for funda-
mentalism to evolve to fundamentalist terrorism, some-
thing that has already happened in the past. According to
Beriain (2011), one of the problems of nihilist fundamen-
talism is not expressing difference, which is something
inalienable in modern thinking, but to impose it with
blood. This author uses an interesting concept: nihilism.
It may be linked to the answer to why these women re-
act that way to the very essence of modernity: laicism
and, more precisely, secularization. This is a key subject
since it poses several questions: are our societies ready
to give room to these forms of living a religion? Should
these new forms of living a religion adapt, in the literal
sense of the term, to the secular essence of our soci-
eties? On the contrary, should social spaces be decon-
structed as to give room to new scenarios? If that was
to be the case, the illustrious pillars that are so rooted
in the very essence of our status quo would be dyna-
mited giving rise to a new scenario, so unlikely that it
would be unthinkable today: Could we humorously talk
about the democracy of fundamentalism? But if that was
not to be the case, these forms of living religion would
stay as they currently are, that is, relegated to the sphere
of secrecy, non-recognition and non-space, always being
watched with distrust, as a potential threat. Are we un-
consciously fueling a situation where groups of a pacific
nature become violent? When the project of forming in-
dividuals that participate of modernity is seen as some-
thing absurd in daily routine—who can imagine a Niqabi
woman teaching at a school or as cashier at a supermar-
ket nowadays?—then violence becomes, very frequently,
the only way of self-affirmation.
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